Personal finance in Jane Austen
簡(jiǎn)奧斯汀時(shí)代的個(gè)人理財(cái)
Percents and sensibility
理性與感性
What did early 19th-century literary characters live on?
19世紀(jì)初的文學(xué)作品中的人物是靠什么生存的？
Dec 20th 2005 | from the print edition of The Economist
譯者：kevinchen4me
There is bitter humour in Lady Denham'sdismissal of her author's own class. As the daughter of a clergyman, who spenther later years living on the generosity of relatives, Miss Austen knew all toowell that wealth was the only real source of security.
這些都是奧斯汀小姐所處社會(huì)階層中尖刻的幽默。身為一名牧師的女兒，但晚年依靠親戚的慷慨資助來(lái)生活的她，奧斯汀小姐深知財(cái)富才是安全感的唯一來(lái)源。
Where did that wealth come from? Theanswer lies in the combination of Britain's growing commercial riches and itsgovernment's continuing poverty. There was really only one kind of investmentfrom the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the railway boom of the 1840s: governmentdebt. British government debt was the only security traded on the StockExchange at its foundation in 1801, and remained so until 1822. Thanks to luckand skill, the government managed to finance a century's worth of horrendouslyexpensive wars in a way that not only did not cripple commerce but mobilisedcommercial resources for new challenges.
而這些財(cái)富又是哪里來(lái)的呢？這正是英國(guó)茁壯成長(zhǎng)的商業(yè)財(cái)富和政府的持續(xù)貧困的結(jié)合。從1720年的南海泡沫事件到1840年代的鐵路繁榮這段時(shí)間里，英國(guó)只有政府債券這唯一一種投資手段。英國(guó)政府債也是倫敦證券交易所在1801年創(chuàng)立之初直到1822年間唯一的一種可交易證券。得益于運(yùn)氣和技巧，英國(guó)政府才能靠著它籌措到那個(gè)世紀(jì)最可怕而奢侈的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的經(jīng)費(fèi)，并且沒有拖垮商業(yè)和貿(mào)易，反而調(diào)動(dòng)起商業(yè)資源去迎接新的挑戰(zhàn)。
The key piece of skill was the mechanismof “funding” that secured interest payments. When William and Maryre-established the Protestant monarchy in 1688, Parliament wanted both to shoreup the royal finances and establish its control over them. Funded borrowing didboth. Parliament passed taxes sufficient to pay interest on a certain amount ofdebt—just over ￡1m in the first instance—then tacked on a bit more tax to paydown the principal gradually. The monarch could borrow against this “funded”amount fairly easily, but found it hard to borrow more, which gave British debtunparalleled stability. In 1715-70 France reneged on the terms of its debt fivetimes; Britain never missed an interest payment.
這種技巧的法門在于用發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債券的方法來(lái)保證短期債券的利息支付。當(dāng)威廉瑪麗在1688重新建立起反抗政權(quán)的時(shí)候，議會(huì)想要鞏固并控制皇家資產(chǎn)。發(fā)行債券就兼顧了這兩種目的。議會(huì)通過了一項(xiàng)足以讓他們付清相當(dāng)數(shù)額債務(wù)的稅，一審?fù)ㄟ^了一百萬(wàn)英鎊，接著附加了一點(diǎn)稅，就使得他們付清了所有的債務(wù)資本金。君王可以輕易地通過這種債券來(lái)籌資，但要借到更多就變得非常困難，這就賦予了英國(guó)政府債空前強(qiáng)大的穩(wěn)定性。在1715-1770年期間，法國(guó)在此種債務(wù)上有過五次違約，而英國(guó)政府卻從未錯(cuò)過任何一次利息的支付。
The big piece of luck was the South SeaBubble. In order to issue debt more cheaply, the government hit upon the wheezeof tying debt issues to the grant of trading privileges, which cost it nothingbut persuaded investors to part with their money at a lower rate of interest.In 1693 the going rate on government debt was 14%. In 1698 the East IndiaCompany was prevailed upon to lend ￡2m at a rate of 8% in return for anextension of trading privileges. This understandably appealed to ministers. In1711, the government raised a further ￡10m from the South Sea Company in returnfor exclusive trading rights to Spanish South America. Finally, in 1719, theSouth Sea Company proposed to take over the finance of the entire nationaldebt. The government agreed.
而最大的幸事莫過于南海泡沫事件。為了以更低的成本發(fā)行債券，政府剛好嗅到需要靠發(fā)行捆綁債券而獲得貿(mào)易特權(quán)的需求的氣息，而其成本只不過是要說服投資者將他們的錢分散到一個(gè)更低利率的投資上。在1693年，政府債的現(xiàn)行率達(dá)到了14%。到了1698年，東印度公司成功地以8%的利率貸出兩百萬(wàn)英鎊，從而獲得了貿(mào)易特權(quán)的延期。而這正是官員們想要的。在1711年，英國(guó)政府以獨(dú)有的南美洲地區(qū)貿(mào)易特權(quán)為代價(jià)，進(jìn)一步向南海公司融資一千萬(wàn)英鎊。而最終在1719年，南海公司提議接管所有的英國(guó)政府債，而政府同意了。
Fortunately for posterity, the directorsof the South Sea Company were greedy and incompetent. They promptly begantalking up the price of their shares with inflated estimates of the value oftheir trading and financing rights, which helped to fuel a dotcom-stylespeculative bubble. After the bust, the government went off the idea ofentrusting its finances to a single company. So it set about devisingsecurities that could sell into a broader market.
對(duì)后代來(lái)講，幸運(yùn)的是，南海公司的理事們是貪婪且無(wú)能的。他們立即開始大肆宣揚(yáng)貿(mào)易和金融特權(quán)的價(jià)值膨脹預(yù)期對(duì)其股價(jià)的有利影響，這直接推動(dòng)了一波互聯(lián)網(wǎng)投機(jī)式的泡沫。而在破產(chǎn)后，政府放棄了單獨(dú)依靠一家公司來(lái)籌資的想法，于是開始著手于設(shè)計(jì)一種能夠銷售到更廣泛的市場(chǎng)范圍中的全新證券。
Early flirtations with lotteries andannuities were generally disappointing. So were “tontines”, a sort of groupannuity in which many paid into a general pot, and the last few survivors splitthe income. What did sell, hesitantly at first, were bonds—albeit ones whichwere often sweetened with “douceurs” like a lottery ticket or two.
獎(jiǎng)券和年金結(jié)合通常是會(huì)讓人失望的。就好比唐提式養(yǎng)老金，一種投入到綜合獎(jiǎng)池中的集體年金，其幸存者瓜分所有的收入。這種證券通常在開賣之初會(huì)難以銷售，即便它經(jīng)常以一兩張樂透彩券作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)來(lái)吸引購(gòu)買者。
The government consoles itself
政府的自我安慰
In 1751 Henry Pelham's Whig governmentpulled together the lessons learnt on bonds to create the security of thecentury: the 3% consol. This took its name from thefact that it paid 3% on a ￡100 par value and consolidated the terms of avariety of previous issues. The consols had no maturity; in theory they wouldkeep paying ￡3 a year forever.
在1751年，亨利佩勒姆的輝格黨政府齊心協(xié)力創(chuàng)造了橫貫整個(gè)世紀(jì)的證券：金邊債券。這名字源于這種債券表面上只為100英鎊的面值支付3%的利息，實(shí)際上卻帶有各種前提條件。該債券并不成熟，理論上來(lái)講，這種債券將需要永遠(yuǎn)為其面額支付每年3英鎊的利息。
Between 1751, when the funded nationaldebt was only a tad over ￡70m, and 1801, when it climbed over ￡450m, thegovernment issued ￡315m of consols. Lord North particularly liked them becausethey carried a low nominal interest rate. He argued that lower rates werebetter because “it was the interest that the people were burdened with thepaying of and not the capital.” That said, Lord North issued new consols at ￡60or so, to create a 5% interest rate. Why he thought a discounted 3% bond wasbetter value than a 5% bond sold at par is unclear.
在1751年間，政府債的規(guī)模僅僅七千萬(wàn)英鎊，但到1801年，這個(gè)數(shù)字直接攀升到了4.5億英鎊的規(guī)模，其中3.15億是金邊債券。腓特烈諾斯爵士獨(dú)愛該種債券，因?yàn)樗回?fù)擔(dān)了相當(dāng)?shù)偷拿x利率。他辯解道，低利率更好是因?yàn)槿嗣窨梢杂媒疱X而不是資本來(lái)承受這項(xiàng)支付。諾斯爵士發(fā)行了六千萬(wàn)英鎊左右的金邊債券而創(chuàng)造出了5%的利率。他認(rèn)為已貼現(xiàn)3%利率的債券要比5%利率的未貼現(xiàn)債券要更好的理由還并不明確。
William Pitt the Younger, however,discovered the downside of discounted bonds when he tried to reduce thenational debt during the lull between the American war and the Napoleonic wars.In theory, the consols could be redeemed by the government at their par valueof ￡100. In practice, doing so would have given a windfall to bondholders:nearly double their capital as well as interest payments. Pitt instead createda sinking fund, using tax revenue to buy back bonds in the market.
然而小威廉皮特發(fā)現(xiàn)了諾斯爵士嘗試要在美國(guó)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的間隙減少國(guó)家債務(wù)時(shí)債券的折扣在下降。理論上來(lái)講，政府能夠以100英鎊的面值贖回這些債券。而實(shí)際上，這樣做給債券持有者帶來(lái)了意外的收獲：他們的資本和利息一樣翻倍了。小威廉皮特重新發(fā)明了一種償債基金作為其替代，利用稅收來(lái)回購(gòu)市場(chǎng)中的債券。
The sinking fund continued in operationthrough the Napoleonic wars, though in an increasingly bizarre fashion. By theend of the wars, the government was borrowing all of the money for the fundfrom the same markets that the fund bought from, in the deluded belief thatreinvesting the interest on the bonds held by the fund would yield compoundreturns sufficient to pay off the whole of the national debt.
雖然是在越來(lái)越多奇怪的風(fēng)尚中，但償債基金還是在拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間得以繼續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)接近尾聲的時(shí)候，政府為償債基金基金借來(lái)了所有的錢，并且是從同一個(gè)市場(chǎng)里，只因輕信了用基金手上的債券進(jìn)行利率再投資可以獲得足以還清所有國(guó)家債務(wù)的錢的說法。
Clearly, the financial markets of JaneAusten's time were not sophisticated. But they were robust. There were noalternatives to easily tradeable, interest-bearing securities, and lots ofpeople wanted them. Merchants put spare cash into the funds, which, as theywould not otherwise have earned interest on the money, boosted their profitsand competitiveness. Some landowners traded back and forth between funds andland in search of better returns. Others saw the funds as a new way to maintaintheir wealth without farming.
顯然，簡(jiǎn)奧斯汀時(shí)期的金融市場(chǎng)并不精致，但規(guī)模卻很粗壯。除有息證券外幾乎沒有其他替代品可以進(jìn)行交易，而且還有大量的人想要買它。商人們將多余的錢投入到基金中去，不然就沒法獲得利息從而使利潤(rùn)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力得以提升。一些地主在基金和土地的投資間尋求更好的回報(bào)。而其他人則認(rèn)為基金是一種讓他們不用通過耕作也能保存財(cái)富的方式。
From a speculator's point of view, thiswas a lively market. The fact that early bonds had no fixed maturity dateensured that any change in interest rate was fully reflected in the capitalvalue of the bond. Rates, in turn, fluctuated in response to foreign affairs ingeneral and military ones in particular. When the British won a battle,investors anticipated the day that the government would stop issuing new bondsand turn to buying old ones via the sinking fund. Rates fell and values rose.When British forces lost, investors anticipated new issues coming to market,and the opposite happened. Compounding these movements were poorcommunications: nobody really knew what was going on in the wars.
從一名投機(jī)者的視野來(lái)看，這真是一個(gè)生氣勃勃的市場(chǎng)。事實(shí)上卻是早期的債券固定到期日的設(shè)計(jì)并不能將利率的變動(dòng)完全地反映到債券的資本價(jià)值上去，而特別地，利率卻是因?yàn)橐话慵败娛掠绊懙耐饨换顒?dòng)而波動(dòng)的。當(dāng)英國(guó)贏得了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，投資者預(yù)期到了政府會(huì)停止發(fā)行新債轉(zhuǎn)而通過償債基金回購(gòu)老的債券。債券利率就下降而價(jià)值上升。而當(dāng)英國(guó)輸了，投資者就會(huì)預(yù)期到新的債券將要發(fā)行，相反的情況就會(huì)發(fā)生。而這些活動(dòng)之間是缺乏信息交流的：因?yàn)闆]人真正知道戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果會(huì)怎樣。
One officer rushed from Portsmouth toLondon with forged dispatches proclaiming the fall of Paris and the rout ofNapoleon, while at the coffee houses his confederates sold into the risingmarket and netted about ￡10,000. Even with full information, early markets didnot always do what a modern trader would expect. In theory, the prices ofvarious securities should have converged around a general market interest rate.Not so in fact. William Fairman of Royal Exchange Assurance noted that “thevery great disparity between the current prices of different funds evidentlyshows that exact observers among the monied men are not numerous”. There wasalso a persistent fear that the government might have so over-extended itselfwith debt that a general failure of markets was inevitable.
一位官員帶著偽造的文件從樸茨茅斯飛奔到倫敦，宣布巴黎失守拿破侖戰(zhàn)敗的消息，過了一會(huì)這位官員的同僚就通過向上升的市場(chǎng)中賣債券而賺了一萬(wàn)英鎊。而就算信息是完全流通的，早期市場(chǎng)中的反應(yīng)也并不總是像現(xiàn)代交易者所預(yù)期的那樣。理論上來(lái)講，各種證券的價(jià)格應(yīng)當(dāng)會(huì)圍繞一個(gè)既定的市場(chǎng)利率上下波動(dòng)。事實(shí)卻不是那樣，英國(guó)皇家交易保險(xiǎn)公司的威廉費(fèi)爾曼指出：“不同基金的現(xiàn)期價(jià)格的不一致顯然告訴我們真正的交易規(guī)則遵守者并不大量存在于有錢人當(dāng)中。”而且有一種持續(xù)的恐懼在于，政府有可能過分?jǐn)U張它的債務(wù)從而使得市場(chǎng)失靈不可避免。
The despairing and the hopeful, thegreedy and those simply too lazy to farm all converged on coffee houses nearthe Royal Exchange to do business. Thomas Mortimer described the scene in“Every Man his own Broker, or, a Guide to Exchange Alley”:
it consists of a medley of news, quarrels, prices ofdifferent funds, calling of names, adjusting of accounts, etc, etc continuallycirculating in an intermixed chaos of confusion.
絕望與希望，貪婪和懶惰，在倫敦皇家交易所附近的咖啡館里雜糅在一起。托馬斯莫迪莫爾在“每個(gè)人都是自己的經(jīng)紀(jì)人，或是通往倫敦交易巷的引路人”中解釋了這種景象：這個(gè)市場(chǎng)由小道消息、爭(zhēng)論、不同基金的價(jià)格、各種被呼喚的名字、賬戶的調(diào)整等等因素組成，并持續(xù)循環(huán)在一種混淆與混亂的并行中。
While trading in the coffee houses wasopen to all, a booming industry of brokers and bankers arose to serve those whodid not wish to brave the hubbub in person. Jane Austen's favourite brother,Henry, started his own bank, though after it failed he reverted to the familybusiness and became a clergyman. In 1801, the Stock Exchange was founded as amembers-only institution intended to bring some order to the markets—and inparticular to ban from membership those who reneged on their deals.
當(dāng)在咖啡館中的交易向所有人開放后，另一種產(chǎn)業(yè)開始大受歡迎，經(jīng)紀(jì)人和銀行家開始去喚起那些并不是那么有勇氣的人。簡(jiǎn)奧斯汀最喜歡的哥哥亨利創(chuàng)立了他自己的銀行，當(dāng)他失敗后就回到家族生意中去了，然后成為了一名牧師。在1801年，倫敦證券交易所成立了，并只有公司可以作為其成員，這也是為了給市場(chǎng)帶去一些秩序，特別地，也是為了取締那些不遵守交易規(guī)則的成員。
By the end of the Napoleonic wars in1815, the debts of the British government reached ￡745m. But instead ofcalamity and national bankruptcy, the rise in debt simply brought a hunger formore investments. As the government itself stopped issuing new bonds, andstarted retiring old ones through the sinking fund, investors turned first toforeign-government securities in the 1820s and then to shares in the new,capital-intensive companies, such as railroads, leading the industrialisationof the 19th century. Both markets were highly speculative, to say the least.Foreign-government debt included bonds from one entirely fictitious country,Poyais, and most of the new industrial ventures failed.
在1815年拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的尾聲，英國(guó)政府債達(dá)到了7.45億英鎊的規(guī)模，不過排除大災(zāi)難和國(guó)家破產(chǎn)，債務(wù)的增長(zhǎng)只提升了對(duì)更多投資的渴望。當(dāng)政府自身已經(jīng)停止發(fā)行新債券并開始通過償債基金回購(gòu)老債券時(shí)，投資者們?cè)?820年代首先開始轉(zhuǎn)向他國(guó)政府證券市場(chǎng)和新興資本密集型公司的股份，比如引領(lǐng)了19世紀(jì)工業(yè)化的鐵道工業(yè)。退一步說，兩種市場(chǎng)都具有非常高的投機(jī)性。外國(guó)政府債甚至包含了一種幾乎完全虛構(gòu)的國(guó)家Poyais的政府債，而且許多新興工業(yè)合資企業(yè)也失敗了。
By then markets were big enough toabsorb the bumps, and their growth has supported a cornucopia of prosperityever since. Still, one shortage noted by Jane Austen in “Mansfield Park”arguably remains: “there certainly are not so many men of large fortune in theworld, as there are pretty women to deserve them.”
到那時(shí)市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)大到足以吸收掉波動(dòng)，并且其成長(zhǎng)很好地支撐了從那時(shí)開始的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮。盡管如此，簡(jiǎn)奧斯汀在《曼斯菲爾德莊園》中所指出的一點(diǎn)不足也長(zhǎng)時(shí)間處于爭(zhēng)論中：“當(dāng)然，那時(shí)的世界中確實(shí)沒有那么多男人擁有巨大的財(cái)富，因?yàn)槟鞘瞧恋呐怂鶓?yīng)得的?！?div>
