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[2005.12.20] Percents and sensibility 利率與情感  

Personal finance in Jane Austen

簡?奧斯丁小說中的個人理財

Percents and sensibility

利率與情感

What did early 19th-century literary characters live on? 

在19世紀初的文學(xué)作品中，書中人物如何謀生？

Dec 20th 2005 | from the print edition

“TEN thousand a year, and very likely more! 'Tis as good as a lord.” Mrs Bennet's reaction to her daughter Elizabeth's engagement to Mr Darcy is telling. “Pride and Prejudice”, like all of Jane Austen's books, is about sex and money. But Miss Austen's emphasis on each is different from that of today's chick-litterateurs. Her characters never touch, let alone kiss. And their wealth and income are at least as important in the calculus of courtship as personal tastes and sex appeal.

“一年有一萬鎊的收入，可能還要多！闊得簡直像個皇親國戚。”班納特夫人聞聽女兒伊麗莎白與達西訂婚的消息后，其狂喜之情溢于言表。就像簡?奧斯丁的其他小說一樣，《傲慢與偏見》描述的是性與金錢。但奧斯丁在小說中對性與金錢的描述與現(xiàn)今的雞仔文學(xué)截然不同。在她的小說中，男女主角們連手都不碰一下，更不用說接吻了。他們的財產(chǎn)與收入狀況在求愛過程中的重要性毫不遜于他們的個人品味與外貌長相。

Miss Austen was neither mercenary nor a snob. She was a daughter of her times. At the turn of the 19th century, wealth merited much discussion. Landed wealth, which dominated the 18th century, was being supplanted by monied wealth, which came to dominate the 19th. Between 1796, when Miss Austen began “Pride and Prejudice”, and 1817, when she died while writing “Sanditon”, land and money (or “funds” as Miss Austen's peers called their investments) stood in rough and uncomfortable equality. In this shifting balance lay the foundations both of the Anglo-Saxon world's commercial prosperity and much of the drama and humour of Miss Austen's books.

奧斯丁小姐絕非貪圖錢財?shù)膭堇∪?，她只是那個時代的一個典型女孩而已。在18與19世紀之交，有關(guān)財富的問題理應(yīng)成為討論的熱門話題。在18世紀，一個人擁有財富的多寡主要是以他擁有多少土地來衡量；而在19世紀，變成了他擁有多少金錢。奧斯丁小姐1796年開始寫作《傲慢與偏見》，1817年在寫作《桑底頓》時撒手人間。在那段時間里，雖然土地與金錢（或如與她社會地位相似人們的叫法，將用于投資購買公債的錢稱之為“基金”）的關(guān)系似乎水火不相容，但大致保持著平衡。在這種動態(tài)平衡中，打下了大英帝國商業(yè)繁榮的基礎(chǔ)，也為奧斯丁小姐的小說提供了大量幽默而富有戲劇性的素材。

Lady Denham, the doyenne of Sanditon, laid out the social order of the time: 

But heiresses are monstrous scarce! I don't think we have had an heiress here, or even a co-heiress, since Sanditon became a public place. Families come after families, but as far as I can learn, it is not one in an hundred of them that have any real property, landed or funded—an income perhaps, but no property. Clergymen maybe, or lawyers from town, or half-pay officers, or widows with only a jointure. And what good can such people do anybody?

嬁菡女士是桑底頓這個地方的元老級人物，她道出了當時的社會秩序*：

至于繼承了大筆財富的女人那可是難得一見！自打桑底頓成了公共領(lǐng)地后，我們這個地方還不曾有過這樣的女人，甚至繼承了部分家產(chǎn)的女繼承人也不曾出現(xiàn)過。這個小鎮(zhèn)上遷來的人口是一家接一家，但據(jù)我所知，只有不到百分之一的家庭擁有用土地或基金換來的房產(chǎn)。其余的人家或許擁有某種收入，但都沒有房產(chǎn)。教士、從倫敦城中來的律師、領(lǐng)取半薪的退役軍官和繼承了亡夫遺產(chǎn)的寡婦們也許都會擁有某種收入，但這樣一些人又會為本地帶來什么好處呢？

There is bitter humour in Lady Denham's dismissal of her author's own class. As the daughter of a clergyman, who spent her later years living on the generosity of relatives, Miss Austen knew all too well that wealth was the only real source of security. 

小說的作者通過嬁菡女士的話貶斥了社會地位與自己類似的人們，顯得既幽默又辛酸。作為一個牧師的女兒，奧斯丁小姐的后半生依靠親屬生活。她深知財富是生活的唯一真正保障。

Where did that wealth come from? The answer lies in the combination of Britain's growing commercial riches and its government's continuing poverty. There was really only one kind of investment from the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the railway boom of the 1840s: government debt. British government debt was the only security traded on the Stock Exchange at its foundation in 1801, and remained so until 1822. Thanks to luck and skill, the government managed to finance a century's worth of horrendously expensive wars in a way that not only did not cripple commerce but mobilised commercial resources for new challenges. 

但財富從何而來呢？答案是英國商業(yè)財產(chǎn)的不斷增長與政府收入的持續(xù)下降。從1720年的南海泡沫事件*到19世紀40年代的修建鐵路大熱潮，實際上參與投資的只有政府債券。1801年倫敦證券交易所成立時，參與交易的有價證券只有政府債券。直到1822年，境況依然如此。靠運氣與巧妙的運作，英國政府設(shè)法為19世紀不斷爆發(fā)的戰(zhàn)爭募集到了數(shù)字驚人的戰(zhàn)爭經(jīng)費。這些舉措不僅沒有損害英國的商業(yè)，而且充分挖掘出了英國的商業(yè)資源，使英國能夠應(yīng)對新的挑戰(zhàn)。

The key piece of skill was the mechanism of “funding” that secured interest payments. When William and Mary re-established the Protestant monarchy in 1688, Parliament wanted both to shore up the royal finances and establish its control over them. Funded borrowing did both. Parliament passed taxes sufficient to pay interest on a certain amount of debt—just over ￡1m in the first instance—then tacked on a bit more tax to pay down the principal gradually. The monarch could borrow against this “funded” amount fairly easily, but found it hard to borrow more, which gave British debt unparalleled stability. In 1715-70 France reneged on the terms of its debt five times; Britain never missed an interest payment.

這種資金運作的關(guān)鍵是建立了保證投資者利益的政府發(fā)行債券機制。當威廉與瑪麗在1688年重新建立新教徒的君主制時*，議會既想募集足夠的資金以支撐王室的運作，又想獲取對這筆支出的控制權(quán)。而發(fā)行政府債券就能一舉兩得。議會批準的稅收總額剛好能夠支付一定數(shù)額的政府債券利息——議會批準的第一項稅收法案征收的稅額為一百萬英鎊多一點。然后議會又批準逐漸增加一點稅額，以償付債券本金。王室從這筆“基金”中借款非常容易，但要超過基金的總額限制就很難了。通過這個辦法，英國政府債務(wù)空前穩(wěn)定。1715~1770年間，法國政府五次食言沒有償還欠債；但英國連一分錢的利息都沒有拖欠過。

The big piece of luck was the South Sea Bubble. In order to issue debt more cheaply, the government hit upon the wheeze of tying debt issues to the grant of trading privileges, which cost it nothing but persuaded investors to part with their money at a lower rate of interest. In 1693 the going rate on government debt was 14%. In 1698 the East India Company was prevailed upon to lend ￡2m at a rate of 8% in return for an extension of trading privileges. This understandably appealed to ministers. In 1711, the government raised a further ￡10m from the South Sea Company in return for exclusive trading rights to Spanish South America. Finally, in 1719, the South Sea Company proposed to take over the finance of the entire national debt. The government agreed. 

最為幸運的是出現(xiàn)了南海泡沫事件。為使發(fā)行的公債更加廉價，英國政府偶然發(fā)現(xiàn)，將債券發(fā)行與特許貿(mào)易權(quán)捆綁在一起是一個好辦法。通過這個辦法，政府可以一毛不拔，但卻能讓投資者掏腰包，以非常低的利率購買國債。在1693年，政府債券的現(xiàn)行利率是14%。而到了1698年，政府說服東印度公司以8%的利率購買了一千萬英鎊的政府債券。其得到的回報是延長了特許貿(mào)易權(quán)。這樣的交易條件當然對政府各大臣們非常具有吸引力了。1711年，英國政府又向南海公司舉債一千萬英鎊，交換條件是，南海公司對西（班牙）屬南美擁有獨家貿(mào)易權(quán)。到了1719年，南海公司提出買斷英國全部國債經(jīng)營權(quán)的計劃。英國政府批準了這項申請。

Fortunately for posterity, the directors of the South Sea Company were greedy and incompetent. They promptly began talking up the price of their shares with inflated estimates of the value of their trading and financing rights, which helped to fuel a dotcom-style speculative bubble. After the bust, the government went off the idea of entrusting its finances to a single company. So it set about devising securities that could sell into a broader market.

但南海公司的高管們既貪婪又昏庸無能，這對后代英國人而言真是一件幸事。他們馬上開始商議如何提高自己的股份收益。他們采取的方法是夸大南海公司的貿(mào)易與國債經(jīng)營權(quán)的估值。這個方法使商業(yè)網(wǎng)站型的投機泡沫迅猛膨脹起來。泡沫破裂后，英國政府放棄了由一家公司買斷國債經(jīng)營權(quán)的做法。政府采用的新方法是發(fā)行面向更大范圍購買對象的新國債。

Early flirtations with lotteries and annuities were generally disappointing. So were “tontines”, a sort of group annuity in which many paid into a general pot, and the last few survivors split the income. What did sell, hesitantly at first, were bonds—albeit ones which were often sweetened with “douceurs” like a lottery ticket or two.

英國政府最初試探性地采用了發(fā)行年金債券與發(fā)行彩票的方法，但效果總的來說令人失望。“湯鼎氏養(yǎng)老金基金”的發(fā)行也同樣失敗。這是一種多人共同購買的一組年金債券，但由少數(shù)幾個最后的生存者分享收益。盡管出售時經(jīng)常贈送一兩張彩票這樣的小禮物，但起初并沒有多少人購買這種債券。

The government consoles itself

英國政府的自慰

In 1751 Henry Pelham's Whig government pulled together the lessons learnt on bonds to create the security of the century: the 3% consol. This took its name from the fact that it paid 3% on a ￡100 par value and consolidated the terms of a variety of previous issues. The consols had no maturity; in theory they would keep paying ￡3 a year forever. 

1751年，亨利?佩勒姆的輝格黨政府總結(jié)了以往發(fā)行政府債券的經(jīng)驗教訓(xùn)，推出了一種世紀債券：年息為3%的統(tǒng)一債券。這是一種每一百英鎊票面價值能獲得3%年息的債券；這種債券將以往發(fā)行的一系列債券統(tǒng)一整合為一個債券項目，因而得名。這種債券沒有約定還本到期日。從理論上講，購買一張債券就可以每年到手3英鎊的年息，永遠如此。

Between 1751, when the funded national debt was only a tad over ￡70m, and 1801, when it climbed over ￡450m, the government issued ￡315m of consols. Lord North particularly liked them because they carried a low nominal interest rate. He argued that lower rates were better because “it was the interest that the people were burdened with the paying of and not the capital.” That said, Lord North issued new consols at ￡60 or so, to create a 5% interest rate. Why he thought a discounted 3% bond was better value than a 5% bond sold at par is unclear.

在1751年，政府通過發(fā)行債券借債只有七千萬英鎊多一點；而到了1801年，這個數(shù)字攀升到了4.5億英鎊。在這期間，政府發(fā)行了3.15億英鎊的統(tǒng)一債券。由于這種債券要支付的年息很低，因而諾斯勛爵*對之青睞有加。他聲稱較低利率的債券更好一些，因為“加在老百姓身上的負擔(dān)是要償還利息，而不是償還本金?！睋?jù)說諾斯勛爵批準發(fā)行了一系列票面價值60英鎊左右，年息為5%的統(tǒng)一債券。他認為以票面價值出售，貼現(xiàn)率為3%債券的價值比貼現(xiàn)率為5%債券的價值更高一些，但其理由尚不明了。

William Pitt the Younger, however, discovered the downside of discounted bonds when he tried to reduce the national debt during the lull between the American war and the Napoleonic wars. In theory, the consols could be redeemed by the government at their par value of ￡100. In practice, doing so would have given a windfall to bondholders: nearly double their capital as well as interest payments. Pitt instead created a sinking fund, using tax revenue to buy back bonds in the market.

The sinking fund continued in operation through the Napoleonic wars, though in an increasingly bizarre fashion. By the end of the wars, the government was borrowing all of the money for the fund from the same markets that the fund bought from, in the deluded belief that reinvesting the interest on the bonds held by the fund would yield compound returns sufficient to pay off the whole of the national debt.

然而，當小威廉?皮特*在美國獨立戰(zhàn)爭與拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束的這段時間內(nèi)試圖削減政府債務(wù)時，他發(fā)現(xiàn)了貼現(xiàn)債券的不利之處。從理論上講，政府可以100英鎊的票面價格收回統(tǒng)一債券，從債券收回溢價中受益。但實際上，這種做法卻是讓債券持有人發(fā)了一筆橫財：幾乎讓他們的本金及利息翻了一番。皮特轉(zhuǎn)而發(fā)行一種償債基金。用政府的年度稅收從市場上購回貼現(xiàn)債券。在拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭期間，償債基金的機制繼續(xù)運作，只是方式益發(fā)古怪了。當這一系列戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束時，英國政府為償債基金所借款項全都來自于購買償債基金的同一個市場。而且自欺欺人地認為，將利息所得重新投資于償債基金發(fā)行的債券上，就能獲得足夠償還國家全部債務(wù)的復(fù)利。

Clearly, the financial markets of Jane Austen's time were not sophisticated. But they were robust. There were no alternatives to easily tradeable, interest-bearing securities, and lots of people wanted them. Merchants put spare cash into the funds, which, as they would not otherwise have earned interest on the money, boosted their profits and competitiveness. Some landowners traded back and forth between funds and land in search of better returns. Others saw the funds as a new way to maintain their wealth without farming. 

簡?奧斯丁時代的金融市場很簡單，這一點毫無疑問。但當時的金融市場已經(jīng)非常健全。對于可交換的付息有價證券而言，這個市場是無法取代的，而且為大眾所需。商人們將閑置的現(xiàn)金用于購買這些基金。沒有這些基金，閑置的金錢就無法生息。通過購買基金生息，英國的商人們獲得了盈利，從而提高了他們的貿(mào)易竟爭能力。一些地主將土地賣掉來購置基金；然后又將購置基金獲得的利潤用于購買土地。通過這種土地與基金間的反復(fù)運作，他們尋求獲取更大的回報。而其他一些人則將基金視為在沒有可種植土地的情況下保持財富的一種新方式。

From a speculator's point of view, this was a lively market. The fact that early bonds had no fixed maturity date ensured that any change in interest rate was fully reflected in the capital value of the bond. Rates, in turn, fluctuated in response to foreign affairs in general and military ones in particular. When the British won a battle, investors anticipated the day that the government would stop issuing new bonds and turn to buying old ones via the sinking fund. Rates fell and values rose. When British forces lost, investors anticipated new issues coming to market, and the opposite happened. Compounding these movements were poor communications: nobody really knew what was going on in the wars. 

從投機者的角度來看，這是一個活躍的市場。早期的政府債券沒有約定還本期限，這樣就確保了任何利率的變化都能完全體現(xiàn)債券的資本價值。債券利率的變化接著又反映了總的外交形勢，特別是軍事形勢。當大英帝國贏得了一場戰(zhàn)爭的時候，投資者們就會預(yù)期政府將停止發(fā)行新的債券，他們就會通過償債基金購買以前發(fā)行的債券，債券的利率就會下降，債券的資本價值就會上升。當英國軍隊打了一場敗仗時，投資者們就會預(yù)期政府將發(fā)行新的債券，就會出現(xiàn)與前述相反的利率變化。如果利率交替出現(xiàn)這兩種變化，人們就無從獲得明了的信息：沒有人知道戰(zhàn)場的形勢到底如何。

One officer rushed from Portsmouth to London with forged dispatches proclaiming the fall of Paris and the rout of Napoleon, while at the coffee houses his confederates sold into the rising market and netted about ￡10,000. Even with full information, early markets did not always do what a modern trader would expect. In theory, the prices of various securities should have converged around a general market interest rate. Not so in fact. William Fairman of Royal Exchange Assurance noted that “the very great disparity between the current prices of different funds evidently shows that exact observers among the monied men are not numerous”. There was also a persistent fear that the government might have so over-extended itself with debt that a general failure of markets was inevitable. 

一名官員帶著偽造的官方報告從樸次茅斯匆匆趕往倫敦，宣稱已經(jīng)攻陷了巴黎，大敗了拿破侖的軍隊。就在政府債券的一片上漲聲中，他的同伙此時就在咖啡館內(nèi)拋出手中的債券，凈賺了約一萬英鎊。即使獲取了完全可靠的信息，早期市場的反映也并非總是如一個今日的交易者所想象的那樣。從理論上講，各種債券的價格變化趨勢應(yīng)該是圍繞一個總的市場利率而趨同。而實際上并非如此?；始医灰妆ｋU公司的威廉?福爾曼就指出：“不同債券的現(xiàn)行價格存在著巨大的差異，顯然，這表明在有錢人中，能夠洞悉市場變化的人不多?！蓖顿Y者也總是擔(dān)心政府也許會負債過重，因而造成不可避免的市場崩潰。

The despairing and the hopeful, the greedy and those simply too lazy to farm all converged on coffee houses near the Royal Exchange to do business. Thomas Mortimer described the scene in “Every Man his own Broker, or, a Guide to Exchange Alley”:

it consists of a medley of news, quarrels, prices of different funds, calling of names, adjusting of accounts, etc, etc continually circulating in an intermixed chaos of confusion.

絕望者與信心滿滿之人，貪婪者與那些只是懶于耕作的農(nóng)夫們都匯集到皇家交易所附近的咖啡館里進行交易。托馬斯?摩帝馬在他的《皆為掮客，又名交易港導(dǎo)游》一書中描述了這種場面：

“這里熙熙攘攘，傳播著各種消息，爭吵聲不絕于耳。有各種債券價格的報價聲，有點名之聲，有喊著買進賣出的聲音，等等，等等。混亂不堪的景象晝夜不斷。

While trading in the coffee houses was open to all, a booming industry of brokers and bankers arose to serve those who did not wish to brave the hubbub in person. Jane Austen's favourite brother, Henry, started his own bank, though after it failed he reverted to the family business and became a clergyman. In 1801, the Stock Exchange was founded as a members-only institution intended to bring some order to the markets—and in particular to ban from membership those who reneged on their deals.

當咖啡館中的債券交易向所有人開放后，債券經(jīng)紀人和銀行家開始大量涌現(xiàn)。他們?yōu)槟切┎辉赣H自到這些人聲嘈雜的場所來進行交易的人們提供服務(wù)。簡?奧斯丁最喜歡的哥哥亨利也開始創(chuàng)辦了他自己的銀行。當這個生意失敗后，他又返回到家庭事務(wù)中，成了一名牧師。1801年，倫敦證券交易所成立了。規(guī)定只有交易所的會員才可以參與交易，目的是為了規(guī)范交易市場的秩序。交易所特別禁止那些在交易中的食言者獲取會員資格。

By the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the debts of the British government reached ￡745m. But instead of calamity and national bankruptcy, the rise in debt simply brought a hunger for more investments. As the government itself stopped issuing new bonds, and started retiring old ones through the sinking fund, investors turned first to foreign-government securities in the 1820s and then to shares in the new, capital-intensive companies, such as railroads, leading the industrialisation of the 19th century. Both markets were highly speculative, to say the least. Foreign-government debt included bonds from one entirely fictitious country, Poyais, and most of the new industrial ventures failed. 

在1815年拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭的尾聲中，英國政府的負債總額達到了7.45億英鎊。這種狀況不但沒有帶來巨大災(zāi)難和國家破產(chǎn)的局面，政府債務(wù)的增加反而提升了更多人參與債券投資的渴望。當英國政府停止發(fā)行新債券，并通過償債基金回購以往發(fā)行的債券時，投資者們在19世紀20年代先是轉(zhuǎn)而購買外國政府債券，然后是購買新興的資本密集型公司的股份，如引領(lǐng)了19世紀工業(yè)化進程的鐵路公司的股份。保守地說，這兩種市場的風(fēng)險都極高。投資者們購買的外國政府債券中，甚至有一種完全虛構(gòu)的國家——博雅斯*的政府債券，而大多數(shù)新興風(fēng)險企業(yè)也都破產(chǎn)了。

By then markets were big enough to absorb the bumps, and their growth has supported a cornucopia of prosperity ever since. Still, one shortage noted by Jane Austen in “Mansfield Park” arguably remains: “there certainly are not so many men of large fortune in the world, as there are pretty women to deserve them.”

但那時的債券市場容量已經(jīng)具有相當規(guī)模，足以消化掉這些損害。而且債券市場還在不斷壯大，支持了從那時開始的經(jīng)濟繁榮。盡管存有爭議，但此時的債券市場仍有不足。正如簡?奧斯丁在《曼斯菲爾德莊園》一書中所言：“世上堪充佳配的麗人雖不缺乏，但可惜的是廣有家資的男人卻不多見?！?/div>